This paper studies the impact of bank monitoring on the risk of US equity REITs. Using a unique, hand-collected data sample of mortgage balances, I show that bank screening and monitoring of REIT assets via utilizing secured mortgage financing (vs unsecured, recourse debt) lowers the overall company risk of a REIT. At the asset level, screening results in primarily retail and office assets located in primary markets, i.e. more transparent assets, being pledged as collateral. Further, I find evidence consistent with the role of lender monitoring for secured, non-recourse mortgage loans.
Introduction
What happens when Real Estate Investment Trusts use mortgages? Some intuition to answer this question is provided by corporate finance literature, that has shown both theoretically and empirically what type of firms rely on secured debt.
1 Prior REIT literature has also enlightened the quandary by examining the equity vs public debt question (Brown and Riddiough, 2003) , (Liu et al., 2015) . In this paper, I bridge the gap between these two areas of study by examining private, secured mortgage debt for REITs both from a company balance sheet and an individual asset stand point.
According to recent literature, collateralized or secured debt is associated with more opaque and higher risk firms.
2 In order to test the effect of secured debt for REITs on a corporate level, I use a hand collected data set of quarterly mortgage balances. In particular, I examine whether financing choices influence REITs systematic and idiosyncratic risk at the firm level.
In order to asses mortgage use on an asset [property] level, I exploit the visible risk characteristics that are readily available to lenders -property type, and asset location. I use the coordinates of the assets to first control for MSA size (my proxy for liquidity) and distance from corporate headquarters (my proxy for monitoring).
A related work (Liu et al., 2015) explores the average tenant and location quality of REIT's holdings and the corresponding choice of unsecured debt vs equity issuance. They find that firms with higher quality tenants and properties in superior locations are more likely to issue public debt [vs equity].
My findings are complementary, as they show that consistent with theory, lenders whose loans are secured by collateral perform greater monitoring of said collateral than unsecured lenders. Thus the hierarchy of risk is inversely related to monitoring with equity assuming the highest risk position, followed by unsecured debt (as shown by (Liu et al., 2015) and lastly, as this paper shows, secured debt.
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) provide a suitable environment to study the collateral/secured debt question because the composition of long term debt tends to include both secured, non-recourse mortgages and unsecured, recourse publicly traded bonds (see Giambona et al. (2012) ). REITs can also choose to pledge either high or low risk assets as loan collateral. However, bank lenders may observe the quality of the tangible assets by up-front screening and ongoing monitoring of the REITs management. Thus, the presence of informed bank lenders may shift the risk profile of encumbered assets to low risk, high quality properties. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly examine the role of the bank screening mechanism in identifying the risk of collateral pledged against secured loans.
The heterogeneity of corporate asset base, opacity of assets and industry variation have in the past presented challenges for studying collateralized debt. Real Estate Investments Trusts (REITs) are well suited to mitigate all three of these challenges. First, REITs are legally required to have real estate as their primary asset base in order to qualify for REIT status. Second, a REIT's asset base has highly observable risk characteristics that are largely attributed to either the propertys location or property type. Lastly, REITs present a homogenous sample vs the general population of firms. As an added benefit, REITs are required to distribute the majority of their earnings, which requires them to access capital markets on an ongoing basis. Thus, transparency of management decision making cannot be obscured by the utilization of retained earnings to fund growth.
I extend the current literature by first investigating the following: given that the firm is the same and that assets pledged as collateral are monitored by the lender, how does the monitoring affect the risk of the firm? Secondly, how are the assets pledged as collateral different from the ones that are unencumbered? To empirically examine the relationship between mortgage loans and collateral risk, I consider the overall company level risk and the proportion of total debt allocated to secured debt.
I utilize a hand-collected data set on the composition of debt (secured (mortgage) as compared to unsecured debt) in order to explicitly test the impact of bank screening on borrowing firm risk exposure. In order to address this question, I calculate the relationship between mortgage use and total company risk as well as firm measures of both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. The findings show total risk is negatively related to the proportion of debt allocated to mortgages. This finding implies that lower risk REIT borrowers are more likely to utilize secured debt in their capital structure.
Since collateralized debt in the form of mortgage lending is associated with the presence of bank screening activity, I show that low risk borrowers signal their creditworthiness to banks by pledging high quality, low risk collateral. I further break down the risk into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, and find that it is predominantly idiosyncratic risk that is reduced by bank screening activity.
To determine the drivers of this effect, I test whether there is a difference in the risk profiles of assets pledged as collateral for mortgages as compared to assets that are unencumbered. I assess a property type liquidity category and a location quality liquidity risk to each asset, using a property level database. The property type liquidity risk is based on whether the assets primary purpose is apartment, office, retail, etc. The location liquidity risk is based on the size of the MSA the asset is located in. I calculate the probability of encumbrance, and find that assets with lower opacity are more likely to be used as collateral in commercial mortgages. These findings support a postulation made by Booth (1992) that lenders screen loans so that lower risk, better quality assets are required as collateral. Next I consider the relationship of monitoring and collateral. Evidence of monitoring is based upon the physical distance between the asset pledged as collateral and the REIT that owns and manages it. I find evidence of ongoing monitoring activity during the course of secured bank mortgage lending. This finding supports Allen and Letdin (2015) that document that due to lender monitoring REIT secured loans have higher interest rates than their unsecured counterparts.
Prior Literature and Hypotheses
In a mortgage scenario the lender has a chance to value and underwrite the asset prior to funding, monitor its performance throughout the life of the loan, and foreclose on the asset in the event of default. Because of this process, secured debt is subject to fewer information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders than if the assets were financed with unsecured debt. Stulz and Johnson (1985) conclude that secured debt reduces the monitoring costs of debt, and therefore secured debt is safer than unsecured debt ceteris paribus. Moreover, they state that existing bondholders are better off if the firm undertakes a new project and finances it partly with secured debt. Stulz and Johnson (1985) and Chan and Kanatas (1985) focus on the pledge of collateral in addition to the financed project, where the project is credit enhanced by additional collateral. This is contrary to the mortgage instrument and their result may or may not be applicable to REITs financing, where the liability of the borrower is limited to the real estate pledged as security. Besanko and Thakor (1987) also conclude that there is a negative relationship between risk and collateral by predicting that lower risk borrowers will pledge more collateral in exchange for a lower interest rate.
In contrast, (Berger and Udell, 1995) show that secured loans are higher risk, as assessed by the higher interest rate in their sample. However, their study excludes mortgages and only focuses on lines of credit. They also find that younger firms with shorter lending relationships are more likely to pledge collateral, which would imply higher risk and more informationally opaque firms are more likely to pledge collateral. Similar conclusions regarding borrowers of lower quality/higher risk being required by lenders to pledge more collateral are shown by Jimnez et al. (2006) in a study of small businesses in Spain. The existing literature does not distinguish between two related yet separate predictions -one is that assets are lower risk and the other that the borrowers are higher risk.
Several prior studies have looked at debt ratings as an indicator of leverage and debt composition. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) find that access to public debt markets is associated with higher leverage, as regular operating firms dont have many alternatives for financing and are thus constrained without access to the bond market. REITs however are not subject to the same constraints, as access to the mortgage market enables them to obtain project specific financing with higher leverage then available from the public debt market. In related work, recently Colla et al. (2013) and Rauh and Sufi (2010) have demonstrated the heterogeneity of debt. Rauh and Sufi (2010) show that secured debt is more prevalent for low-credit-quality firms, and has tight covenants. In contrast, REIT secured debt does not imply company level covenants, and it is the public debt that introduces restrictions at the corporate level.
REITs have a choice in sources of funds: secured debt (collateralized by property), unsecured debt and equity. Issues impacting the firms optimal capital structure, such as tax benefits of debt Graham (2000) , and dividend implications of debt Miller and Modigliani (1961) , are not applicable to REITs since REITs do not pay taxes and are required to distribute the majority of their earnings as dividends. Thus, the study of REITs provides an opportunity to study capital structure choice abstract from dividend policy and tax considerations. The decision of two types of debt is unique to REITs, as they are required to hold real estate (vs engage in operating activities) and thus could use exclusively secured debt for all of their assets. Giambona et al. (2012) find that higher use of mortgages indicates that a firm is of inferior quality, as proxied for by Tobin's Q. I postulate that these firms are simply lower risk. A REIT is a collection of real estate investments, a series compiled over time, and its debt structure is culmination of accumulation of a series of asset level financing decisions and/or corporate level decisions. Morellec (2001) finds that pledging part of the firms assets as collateral increases firm value. Secured debt prevents the firm from selling assets and as such reduces the default probability and preserves liquidation value. It also reduces bankruptcy costs due to lower enforcement costs. Pledging assets reduces the probability of default. Monitoring the assets reduces firm risk. These priors lead me to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A higher allocation to mortgages as a percentage of total debt should be associated with a borrower of lower risk.
Since a REIT is a company that owns and manages real estate assets as its primary line of business, the risk of the assets and the company are closely aligned. Moreover, secured loans to REITs are in the form of mortgages which have distinct pledges of encumbered assets and which are non-recourse to other, non-pledged firm assets.
Hypothesis 2: Assets pledged as collateral for mortgages (secured, non-recourse loans) are lower risk than unencumbered assets.
In order to test the second hypothesis, I consider those property characteristics that are known by the screening banks prior to the granting of a mortgage loan: location (Chichernea et al., 2008) and property type (Ambrose and Nourse, 1993 and ones that are difficult to change; as such I believe that they are the most important risk characteristics of the assets. Recent studies (Giambona et al. (2012) , Giambona et al. (2013) ) establish a strong link between real estate as a pledged asset class and a lender's willingness to extend loans.
One of the defining attributes of secured bank debt is monitoring of the assets. Rajan and Winton (1995) show that pledging collateral incentivizes the lender to monitor. Monitoring ensures that the value of the asset does not fall below the face value of the loan. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) show that physical distance matters for monitoring and gathering of information. Using location I can calculate the distance of the property to the headquarters of the REIT. I use the distance as a proxy for monitoring of the asset by the borrower.
Hypothesis 3: Assets that are more likely to be monitored [less distant from the management at parent company headquarters] are more likely to be pledged as collateral
By assessing whether the likelihood of a property being pledged as collateral is impacted by its distance from the REIT, I test whether the lender expects the borrower to monitor the asset. The alternative explanation would be that the lender expects to be the sole monitor of the pledged asset and not assign any importance to the borrower managing it, as they expect to own it in a bad state.
Unfortunately the identity and location of the lender are not known, to test what monitoring the lender may perform directly. However, as Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) have shown, lenders are more likely to provide financing to borrower in close physical proximity. Thus the distance between the asset and the borrower is a proxy for the distance between the lender and the collateral property asset.
Data Overview and Methodology
I utilize two data sets: one on the firm (REIT) level and one on the property (asset) level. The REIT-level database includes quarterly observations of REIT operating performance. The property data set provides asset level encumbrance, location and property type information.
REIT Level Data
The Since many REITs could access the public debt and equity markets to fulfill their funding needs, controls for issuance of both were included. Public debt and equity issuance data were obtained from SNL. Property investment is the expected purpose for REITs to seek external funds. However, a potential alternate use of funds could be equity repurchases. In order to address this concern, information for equity repurchases was obtained from The mean percent of Mortgages as a share of Total Debt for each quarter in the sample is shown in Table 2 . Despite fluctuations, the mean has been consistently above 50% of Total Debt. Thus I believe that Mortgages are a very important component of REIT capital issuance decisions and understanding thereof sheds light on predicting riskiness of REITs in the future.
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1 . MORTGAGES as a proportion of total debt average 60.5% for the pooled sample. The complete distribution of Mortgages as a share of Total
Debt is shown in Figure 1 . While there are REITs that do not utilize mortgages at all and those that tend to rely exclusively on mortgages, the majority of the sample is distributed over a spectrum of mortgage use. SIZE is calculated as a natural log of market value. The market value of the company is determined by subtracting the book value of equity from total assets and adding back the market value of equity. LEVERAGE is calculated as Total Debt divided by Market Value.
The average leverage for REITs in the sample is 44.7 percent. AGE is shown in quarters, and thus the average age of a company is approximately 9.5 years. Growth Opportunities proxied for by Market to Book is 1.22 (nearly identical to Harrison et al. (2011) indicates activity, and 0 lack thereof. Comparing to the general public stock market study by Colla et al. (2013) where they find that 60 percent of firm year observations in their sample have debt ratings, the REIT sample has 41 percent of firm quarter observations with a debt rating. Given that this a pooled sample, the average number of companies with a debt rating is not necessarily reflected in the mean statistic. When the sample is bifurcated into rated and unrated companies in the Robustness section, the total number of companies with a debt rating is 87 out of the total sample of 216 REITs. Out of the 87 REITs with a debt rating, 25 obtain it during the sample period.
To examine the mortgage use over time, Table 2 provides a quarterly breakdown of the mean debt allocation to mortgages. Column 2 of Table 2 shows the number of unique firm observations in each quarter, with 107 being the lowest and 135 the highest. There is a marked increase in rela- period when the stocks were undervalued from the managements perspective.
Property Level Data
Prior to offering a mortgage to a borrower the lender is able to observe the risk profile of the asset during their due diligence period. In order to estimate the probability of a property being pledged as collateral, the observable risk components of a property are considered. Property characteristics such as location (Chichernea et al., 2008) and property type (Ambrose and Nourse, 1993 ) are some of the major factors that determine the risk and return that a property investment is likely to generate. Table 7 provides the summary statistics for the property sample. SNL provides all street addresses and some coordinates for the properties owned by REITs. Addresses were used to obtain the missing coordinates for 2,300 properties. The final sample consists of 60,160 unique property coordinates over the sample time period of 1994 to 2012. The coordinates of the REITs headquarters were obtained based on headquarter street addresses. ArcGIS was used to calculate the distance, in miles, from a REITs headquarters to each one of the assets they own each quarter. The greatest distance from a REIT to an asset they own is 5,128 miles, however 95 percent of the sample is within 2,500 miles. The sample mean distance is 972 and the median is 818 miles.
The shortest distance is less than one mile, and 25% of the property sample is within 350 miles from their respective owners. An illustration of the distance calculation is demonstrated in Figure 2 which uses HCP, a healthcare REIT with headquarters in Irvine, CA and their real estate holdings nationwide.
SNL provides encumbrance data for individual assets. A shortcoming of the dataset is that one cannot distinguish among properties with zero debt and those that do not report it. Thus the determining whether or not the asset is pledged as collateral could be omitting some observations of assets that are pledged. However this should only weaken the difference (if any) between encumbered and unencumbered assets.
Property Risk Characteristics
To assess the important of observable risk characteristics on the probability of asset encumbrance, I assign risk characteristics to the descriptive attributes such as property type and location. Different property types yield different returns and their performance is reflected in their capitalization rates (Net Operating Income divided by Transaction price) as shown by Ambrose and Nourse (1993) among others. Figure 3 reproduces a 2013 report based on NCREIF Cap Rate Survey, showing the premium on different property types has been fairly consistently ranked over time. Multifamily trades at the lowest cap rates, followed by Office, Retail, and Industrial. Other property types such as hospitality are known to trade at even higher premiums Ambrose and Nourse (1993) . Motivated by both priors and market evidence, I group the properties into major categories. Whether or not an asset was acquired as a part of a portfolio (PORTFOLIOBUY) is a binary variable with a value of 1 for yes and 0 for no. Nearly forty seven percent of the sample were portfolio acquisitions (vs individual asset purchases). While the data is only available for about two thirds of the sample, slightly over twenty percent of the properties were sold as a part of a portfolio as well, as noted in PORTFOLIOBUY, also a binary variable. Whether or not an asset is a part of a portfolio is an important consideration of a firms mortgage decision, since it imply that more than one asset was used for collateral for a loan as in Brown and Riddiough (2003) or that a portfolio loan was assumed at the time of the acquisition. In thirteen percent of the observations, the properties were acquired as a part of a merger. Similar to a portfolio acquisition, a merger could also signal a potential lack of active decision on the REITs part as the assets could have mortgage debt already in place. The decision to recapitalize is not observed in this sample.
Empirical Findings

Borrower [REIT] Level Risk
In this section, I consider the impact of lender screening, monitoring and collateral requirements on the overall firm (REIT) risk, as conjectured in Hypothesis 1. In order to test Hypothesis 1, I
examine the relationship between mortgage utilization and the total, systematic, idiosyncratic risk of the REIT firm. Total Risk is defined as the standard deviation of REIT returns calculated on a quarterly basis using daily values. The regression specification is as follows:
T otalRisk j,t = α j,t + γ 1j,t M ortgage + γ 2j,t Leverage + γ 3j,t P rof itability+ γ 4j,t DebtRating + γ 5j,t Age + γ 6j,t Size + ε j,t (1)
The results are shown in Table 3 . In line with prior literature, leverage and risk are positively related. However, allocating debt towards mortgages is associated with lower risk. Column 2 includes control variables. Size and Profitability have a negative relationship with risk, however only Size is significant. Leverage remains positive and significant. Mortgages remain negative and statistically significant. Column 3 reports estimation with firm fixed effects for a look at variation within a firm.
Allocation of debt towards mortgages significantly lowers total firm risk. The finding is the same in Column 4, where variation between firms is considered. Those firms that utilize more mortgages, controlling for overall leverage, are less risky. More profitable firms are found to be less risky as are larger firms.
To study the impact of Mortgages further, I separate systematic and idiosyncratic risk. In order to do so, I first estimate a one factor CAPM using the CRSP value weighted market index. The CRSP value weighted market index serves as a proxy for market return. Daily returns obtained from CRSP are used to estimate quarterly Betas for each REIT. The Beta serves as a proxy for systematic risk.
The residual from the equation serves as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk. The regression is as follows: β j,t = α j,t + γ 1j,t M ortgage + γ 2j,t Leverage + γ 3j,t P rof itability+ γ 4j,t DebtRating + γ 5j,t Age + γ 6j,t Size + ε j,t (3) Res j,t = α j,t + γ 1j,t M ortgage + γ 2j,t Leverage + γ 3j,t P rof itability+ γ 4j,t DebtRating + γ 5j,t Age + γ 6j,t Size + ε j,t (4) Table 6 reports the determinants of idiosyncratic risk. This finding is consistent with the first hypothesis, that higher allocation to mortgages should be associated with lower risk. The finding is robust to inclusion of control variables as in Column 2. Column 3 The coefficient on Mortgage however is still negative and highly statistically significant. The robustness section includes predicting public market access as well as bifurcating the sample and only considering those firms that have access to public debt markets.
Collateral Risk
Hypothesis 2 conjectures that in the presence of bank screening activity, lower risk assets are more likely to be pledged as collateral than higher risk assets. I utilize the property risk variables in order to examine the risk of encumbered properties as compared to unencumbered properties. 
The regression results are shown in Table 8 . The binary dependent variable is whether or not a property is encumbered and the regression is estimated using probit, using the property level data on over 476,000 property quarters. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, both risk measures are statistically significant and negatively related to the probability of an asset being encumbered by a mortgage. The omitted property risk type 1 is Multifamily. In order to examine whether the results are capturing other phenomena, I include control variables for time (quarter) and whether or not the property was purchased or sold as a part of a portfolio, or acquired through a merger. The results are demonstrated in Table 9 . The sample size is decreased by over a third due to the lack of availability of control variables for all of the observations. The resulting sample size is approximately 300,000 observations. Columns 1 through 2 include the explanatory risk variables individually with controls. Column 3 includes all of the explanatory risk variables together along with controls. An asset that is a part of a portfolio or a merger has a higher likelihood of being pledged as collateral.
All risk characteristics remain statistically significant and negative, even when both are included simultaneously as in Column 3.
Monitoring and Risk
Next I test Hypothesis 3, assets that are more likely to be monitored are more likely to be pledged as collateral. Probability of monitoring is defined as the distance from the asset to the borrowers headquarters. Table 10 provides the results of testing Hypothesis 3. Column 1 reports univariate results, where a statistically significant negative relationship is established between distance and likelihood of the asset collateralization. Its converse is then true, strong likelihood of active monitoring by the owner (close proximity to company headquarters) means the asset is more likely to be used as collateral for a mortgage Column 2 includes control variables, and the relationship remains highly statistically significant. Column 3 includes MSA Type Risk, 4 categories of Property Type Risk and
Monitoring in the same regression along with controls. All remain highly statistically significant and negatively correlated to the likelihood of property encumbrance.
Robustness Tests
The robustness tests are divided into two alternative explanations. First, several studies have shown that the ability to access bond markets could be driving by the heterogeneity of debt (Faulkender Petersen (2006 ), Rauh Sufi (2010 , Colla et all (2013) ). I therefore perform a robustness check by bifurcating the sample into firms with and without public market debt access, using bond rating as a proxy for market access. I estimate Equation 4 for the subsample with access to public debt market. The Results are reported in Table 11 . Column 1 shows only those REITs that had access to the bond markets. REITs with market access are still found to be less risky in terms of idiosyncratic risk when a higher proportion of their debt is allocated towards mortgages. Brown and Riddiough (2003) study the characteristics of public (unsecured i.e. recourse debt)
issuers. They find that REITs that issue public debt do so to achieve target total leverage ratios, to retain an investment grade credit rating, and fund investment opportunities with equity. Brown and Riddiough (2003) show a negative relation between the likelihood of a public debt issue and the pre-offer secured debt, ie firms with higher proportion of secured debt would tend to issue equity or obtain more secured debt to fund their investment opportunities. Given that the access to public debt markets is potentially endogenous for REITs, I use a two stage approach to first estimate the probability that a REIT will have access to the bond market and subsequently include the estimated parameter into the risk equation. The first stage results are shown in Table 12 . As in Faulkender
Petersen (2006), I use Age and Size to predict public market access. 
Conclusion
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(1) Table 11 : Robustness: Idiosyncratic Risk and Access to the Public Debt Markets To verify that access to the public debt markets is not driving the result, REITs without public debt are excluded. The regression shows only REITs with access to the public debt markets (proxied for by whether or not the REIT has a debt rating). Idiosyncratic risk, the residual estimated in Equation (4) 
